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Abstract
In a controlled laboratory experiment, subjects had to fold letters in order to earn money. 
While the net income per letter was the same in the three treatments, the gross income varied 
and the tax rate was 0, 25% and 50%. Although work incentives should be the same in all 
treatments, subjects worked harder and longer when they were taxed. We conclude that this is 
due to a ‘gross-wage illusion effect’. The existence of this effect demonstrates that not only 
the tax rate and the tax base are of importance for work incentives, but also the perception of a 
tax.
JEL Classification: H2, C91 
2Introduction
How do people react if they are taxed? In particular: How is the work-versus-leisure decision 
affected by a tax? This question has been intensively debated in theoretical models and in a 
couple of experimental papers. While the theoretical predictions are quite clear, the experi-
mental evidence is mixed. Some experiments seem to confirm even very sophisticated theo-
retical predictions and others show that subjects’ decisions are far away from rational choice. 
For example SILLAMAA (1999b) tested the theorems presented by PHELPS (1973), SADKA 
(1976) and SEADE (1977) that show that social welfare and total work effort is higher under a 
zero top marginal tax rate than under any other non-linear tax rate. In her experiment, she of-
fered subjects after-tax wage rates and observed the work effort following this offer. Using a 
decoder sheet, subjects had to translate numbers into letters. It turned out that the efforts were 
higher under a zero top marginal tax than under a regressive tax rate. In SILLAMAA (1999a) 
differences between (Hausman equivalent) linear and non-linear taxes are investigated. Once 
again, the theoretical prediction that work incentives under a linear tax are higher is con-
firmed. SWENSON (1988) and SILLAMAA (1999c) more directly tested the effect of different 
linear tax rates on labor supply. Both experiments show that subjects react to increasing tax 
rates as theory predicts. This result is confirmed in the experiment by SUTTER & WECK-
HANNEMANN (2003). On the other hand, BARTOLOME (1995) found that individuals tend to 
use the average tax rate when making marginal economic decisions, instead of the marginal 
tax rate. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the perception of an individual’s mar-
ginal tax rate is not always correct (LEWIS 1978, FUJII & HAWLEY 1988, KÖNIG ET AL. 1995, 
RUPERT & FISCHER 1995, ARRAZOLA ET AL. 2000). 
Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) have demonstrated in a field experiment that taxes on con-
sumer goods are totally ignored if they are not explicitly posted on the price tags. They con-
clude that taxes without salience will not be perceived correctly. Beside the discussion on tax 
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scientific agenda. Congdon, Klink and Mullainathan (2009) make the point very clear: “Indi-
viduals will respond not to the tax rate as it is set but as they construe it.” (p. 378). The more 
complex taxes are, the larger may be the difference between the taxes as they are set and what 
tax payers construe. What does this mean for the impact of income taxes on the work-leisure-
decision? Chetty and Saez (2009) find that additional information over the EITC system leads 
to behavioral reaction and they conclude that the EITC is too complicated to be perceived cor-
rectly. But what is about simple forms of taxation on earned income, which can easily be un-
derstood? Are they perceived correctly? In this paper we show that this is not the case. We 
use an experimental approach and we designed our experiment in a way that deviates from the 
experimental literature on this topic.  
The experimental designs used in the aforementioned experimental papers are quite artificial 
and do not mirror the decisions of real tax payers. The experimenters renounce a high external 
validity of their designs, but seek to build an optimal platform for the test of tax theories. For 
example, in all the experiments of SILLAMAA only the after-tax wage was announced and any 
kind of tax-framing was avoided. SWENSON (1988) and SILLAMAA (1999c) used a within sub-
ject design, in which subjects had to decide on their work effort while being taxed sequential-
ly at different rates. Whether or not the sequence of tax rates influences behavior was not con-
trolled. Furthermore, in order to control for income effects, the tax revenue is redistributed to 
the subjects. The work-leisure decision is established in the laboratory by offering subjects 
newspapers and computer games they could use instead of working – which is quite different 
from the real work-leisure decision people have to make when they decide on their work ef-
fort. SWENSON had three different treatments with only six subjects in each, which is a very 
small sample even for experiments. It should be clear that differences in individual ability and 
4willingness to work may play an important role. With only six subjects in each treatment this 
effect may dominate the results. 
In SILLAMAA (1999a) subjects had to decide on their work effort at 8 different tax rates, which 
were applied sequentially for 12 minutes each. In the first and in the last treatment, the tax 
rate was zero. On comparison of the (identical) first and the last treatment, a clear learning 
effect shows up. The average work effort increased from the first to the last no-tax treatment 
by more than 18%. The maximum difference was 6% in the 6 remaining tax treatments. Be-
sides a learning effect, it is clear that subjects differ with respect to their ability to translate 
numbers into letters. SILLAMAA tried to control for both effects, but given that the effort levels 
under different taxes differ by no more than 6%, the results, although significant, are not very 
resilient.  
With the experiment we report on in this paper, we do not want to test how individuals react 
to changes in the marginal tax rates or to compare linear and non-linear tax functions. We are 
asking a much simpler question. Imagine that an individual earns one euro for a fixed work 
effort. Does it make a difference whether this euro is after-tax income with a positive tax rate 
or whether the work is not taxed at all? At first sight this seems to be a trivial question, be-
cause obviously the individual work decision should be the same in both cases. But the point 
is that in the case of a positive tax on labor income, labor has two prices (net of tax and the 
gross price). The question is: Does the gross price influence the individual labor decision? 
This depends on how the tax part of the gross wage is perceived. If individuals discern it cor-
rectly the tax should not change the work-leisure decision. Notice that a tax with a constant 
marginal rate of 25% or 50% is very simple but not very salient. Thus the question is if sim-
plicity of a tax is enough to ensure that it is perceived correctly. 
Since we want to investigate the perception of taxes in order to learn how taxation may affect 
real individual labor supply, we designed the experiments in contrast to the existing literature 
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ployed people as subjects (no students) and conducted a real effort experiment. Furthermore, 
subjects had to make a real work-leisure decision because they decided not only about their 
work effort but also about the time they spent on work. There was no time restriction. Be-
cause the experiment was financed by the German Federal Ministry of Finance, we could use 
real taxes. On the other hand, we did not redistribute the taxes to the subjects because in the 
real tax world, the quantity of public goods taxpayers consume is, in fact, independent of the 
taxes they personally pay. The income effect of the taxation does not play a role in our expe-
riments, because we only compare treatments with identical net income. It turns out that our 
subjects are not neutral with respect to the gross price for their work. They show a kind of 
‘gross-wage illusion’, e.g. they work longer and harder when the gross price exceeds the net 
price compared to a situation in which net and gross wage are identical. 
In the next section, we describe the experiment in more detail. The results are presented in 
section 3 and the paper ends with a short discussion in section 4. 
2.Experimentaldesign
We recruited our subjects by making a random selection of addresses from the local telephone 
book. We wrote a letter to all the selected households and invited them to participate in our 
study, announcing that we would contact the household by phone a few days later. In this tel-
ephone call, we clarified whether the person was willing to participate and whether he or she 
fulfilled our minimum requirement of being employed with at least 30 regular working hours 
per week. All the experiments started in the late afternoon and were conducted in the rooms of 
the MaXLab (Magdeburg Laboratory for Experimental Economics). No more than 13 persons 
participated in a single session at the same time. Subjects were located in soundproofed 
booths and at computer desks which were separated from each other. No communication was 
allowed during the experiment. 
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In the reference treatment, subjects were told that they would earn 9 eurocent per folded letter. 
They were further informed that they could stop working whenever they wanted to and that 
there was no time limit. After finishing work, every subject in each treatment was immediate-
ly paid in cash and was asked to fill out a questionnaire, in which we asked for demographic 
parameters such as age, education, kind of employment and income. All subjects agreed to 
answer these questions.
In the second treatment, subjects were told that they would earn 12 eurocent per letter, but 
that this income would be taxed at a constant rate of 25%. The subjects were informed that 
their net income would be paid after they had finished work. In the third treatment, the gross 
wage was 18 eurocent per letter and the tax rate was 50%. Therefore, the net wage was the 
same (9 Cent) in all three treatments. The taxes which were not refunded to the subjects can 
be seen as a real tax insofar as they reduced the amount of money the Federal Ministry of 
Finance had to pay for the experiment. We played the reference treatment twice with a time 
lag of about 5 months (winter and early summer) in order to check whether the opportunity 
costs might be higher in summer than in winter. Because we could not find any significant 
differences, we pooled the data. Table 1 shows the number of observations in our three treat-
ments. 
Treatment Gross wage Number of subjects 
Reference 9 ct 60
25% tax 12 ct 36
50% tax 18 ct 31
Table 1: Overview of treatments and number of independent observations 
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should not observe significant differences between the three treatments.  
3.Results
The most important result of our study is that subjects worked longer and folded many more 
letters in the tax treatments than in the reference treatment. Table 2 and figure 1 display the 
number of letters: 
Treatment Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance
Reference 148.72 145.50 25 405 6,758.21
25% tax 256.06 170.50 19 1213 67,072.85
50% tax 202.16 182.00 31 356 7,485.14
Table 2: Number of letters folded 
Figure 1: Number of letters folded 
The differences between ‘Reference’ and the two tax treatments are significant at a 5% level 
(Mann-Whitney-U-test, two-sided). No significant difference exists between the two tax 
treatments. Table 3 and figure 2 show the working time in the three treatments: 
8Treatment Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance
Reference 64.87 61.50 14 169 960.83
25% tax 89.14 66.00 13 312 4,595.72
50% tax 77.81 79.00 11 124 864.96
Table 3: Working time 
Figure 2: Working time 
The difference between the reference treatment and the 50% tax treatment is still highly sig-
nificant (p < 0.04) but the difference between the reference treatment and the 25% tax treat-
ment is only weakly significant (p < 0.11). Differences between the two tax treatments are not 
significant. Work effort can be measured not only by the number of folded letters but also by 
productivity, e.g. the average time a subject needs to fold a letter. Figure 3 shows that produc-
tivity was much higher in the tax treatments than in the reference treatment and that these dif-
ferences are both highly significant (p < 0.01).
9Figure 3: Productivity measured as seconds per letter 
In order to check if individual characteristics such as income or age might be responsible for 
the “gross-wage illusion”, we run a regression analysis using the data we collected after the 
experiment. Table 4 shows the results of a linear regression with the number of folded letters 
as the dependent variable. As independent variables, we use dummies for the treatment va-
riables, which take the value of 1 if a subject participated in the respective treatment. Fur-
thermore, we defined dummies for several variables: a dummy for ‘gender’ (female = 0, male 
= 1), a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the person is in an ‘executive position’, a dummy 
for ‘brain work’, and a dummy for the question of whether the person had worked the day the 
experiment was carried out (‘worked today’). The variables ‘age’ and ‘income’ (net house-
hold income by month) were measured on a 6-point scale from 1 (20 – 25 / below 1,000 euro) 
to 6 (older than 65 / more than 3,000 euro). The variable ‘education’ was also measured on a 
point scale from 1 (no completed apprenticeship) to 5 (university degree). We further asked 
the subjects how they felt at work in general (‘value work’) and how exhausting they found 
the experiment (‘experiment exertion’). Both were measured on a 10-point scale from 1 (total-
ly dissatisfied / relaxing) to 10 (deeply satisfied / exhausting). The variable ‘hours per week’ 
indicates the number of hours a participant work per week on average. 
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The OLS regression shows that the coefficient of the 25% tax treatment variable is highly sig-
nificant and the 50% coefficient is weakly significant. Not surprisingly, age also turns out to 
have a weakly significant negative influence.
 Non-standardized Standardized
Beta Beta Standard dev. 
constant 232.81* 119.1 
25% tax 101.25*** 35.5 .281 
50% tax 61.47* 36.0 .162 
age - 27.12* 14.8 - .164 
gender - 27.39 31.6 - .083 
education 1.33 12.4 .011 
hours per week .31 1.8 .016 
brain work 59.43 43.7 .133 
executive position - 27.55 30.4 - .085 
worked today - 65.10 39.7 - .149 
value work 1.90 8.2 .022 
experiment exertion - .34 7.1 - .004 
income 5.14 10.2 .048 
*** significant at a 1% level, ** 5%, * 10% 
Table 4: OLS regression, dependent variable “number of letters folded”. 
In addition to this OLS regression, we ran a logit regression on the basis of a cluster analysis. 
This allowed the number of letters folded by a subject to be classified as “high” or “low”. 
Once again, the tax treatment variables are significant, all others are not. Based on these re-
sults, we can be very sure that the “gross-wage illusion” effect is not driven by particular per-
sonal characteristics of our subjects but by the tax label itself. 
4.Discussion
Our experiment demonstrates that the existence of a gross wage that differs from the net wage 
after-tax leads to higher work efforts compared to a gross wage that is identical to the net 
wage. We call this effect a ‘gross-wage illusion’ because we believe that the reason for the 
higher effort is that subjects mix up the gross wage and the net wage. It should be emphasized 
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that this cannot be explained by a lack of transparency, because the instructions and the de-
sign of the experiment made perfectly clear that only the net wage would be paid at the end of 
the experiment. Nevertheless, subjects tend to use the gross wage as an orientation when they 
decide on their work effort. The fact that the “gross-wage illusion” is of the same magnitude 
in both tax treatments shows that sensitivity to taxation increases with higher tax rates – oth-
erwise the illusion effect would have been stronger in the 50% treatment.  
Our experiment shows that the misperception of taxes is not limited to complex tax schedules. 
Even a simple tax rule like a constant marginal tax rate of 25% generates a distortion like the 
“gross wage illusion”. One possible explanation is that it is exactly the simplicity of the tax 
that drives the results because a simple tax may be not salient. Further research should answer 
the question, if a more complex tax system will be perceived more correctly because it is 
more salient. 
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Appendix: Instructions of the 25% tax treatment 
With your participation in this experiment you have the opportunity to earn money. The 
payoff at the end of the experiment depends on your individual effort. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully. If you have any further questions, please contact the experimentator. 
Primary note: 
The aim of this experiment is to achieve information about the individual labor supply. For 
this purpose you will be confronted with a real work task, whereby you earn money. To com-
pare the data of various research participants, work task is chosen in a way that absolutely no 
previous knowledge or special talent is required and that it is easy to measure. 
Procedure:
We would like to point out that communicating with other participants or leaving your seat is 
not allowed for the duration of the whole experiment. After reading the instructions you re-
ceive letter papers and envelopes. Your task is to fold these letters and to put them into enve-
lopes. Please seal up the envelopes. The letters are applied to acquire research participants in 
Magdeburg.
Depending on the number of folded and bagged letters you receive a payoff at the end of the 
experiment. For each letter you receive 12 Cent. If you fold on average 2 letters per minute, 
this leads to an hourly wage of 14.40 Euro, 2.5 letters on average 18.00 Euro and 3 letters 
21.60 Euro. From your earned amount a tax with a rate of 25% is deducted, the rest is paid 
out to you at the end of the experiment in cash. 
You determine your working time by your own. This means that there is no time limit and 
you can stop the experiment at any time. Afterwards, you receive your payoff dependent on 
the above stated rule and you are allowed to leave the laboratory. 
Enjoy yourself!
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